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Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith a note on the allegations contained in the letter from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation dated 10 February 2016 (S/2016/143) (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

16-03744 (E) 110316

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Annex to the letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The note attached to the letter of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation is composed of baseless allegations.

Becoming a direct party in the Syrian conflict, Russia has been responsible for civilian deaths, havoc and destruction in Syria in proportions and effectiveness that can only be matched by the regime.

Independent studies confirm that the Russian Federation accounts for up to 70 per cent of civilian deaths that are taking place in Syria. Since its military involvement began in Syria on 30 September 2015, Russian air strikes have already claimed over 1,300 lives. Ninety per cent of these victims are civilians. The attacks left over 2,000 people wounded. A note pointing out these casualties in further detail is enclosed to the present note (enclosure I).

Russia today is also directly responsible for the indiscriminate and total destruction of civilian infrastructure, another common denominator with the regime's practices. This, too, adds to the humanitarian tragedy at a time when the international community is desperately trying to get sustained humanitarian aid to the Syrian people living under besieged areas also in relation to Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), which the Russian Federation helped draft, but effectively blocked the implementation thereof.

Deliberate targeting of hospitals, schools, food stocks, water and electricity distribution networks amounts to war crimes.

Russia entered the Syrian theatre under the pretext of fighting Daesh/ISIL and terrorism. After over 8,000 strikes, 90 per cent of which targeted the opposition elements, there is not a single shred of evidence that Russian strikes made any impact against Daesh/ISIL. Terrorism has grown and spread.

The baseless allegations against Turkey, hosting the more than 2.5 million Syrians, are being levelled by Russia against this backdrop. Russia's and the regime's continued attacks since the cessation of hostilities put the entire political process at risk and therefore carry the potential for additional mass movement of Syrians in literally tens of thousands to our borders.

If the Russian Federation is serious about fighting terrorism, it should move its focus on the regime in a serious effort to get the political process to become functional. The Russian Federation's current course is only adding fuel to the fire by also directly participating in the conflict by raising the level and intensity of the violence. The only way out of this vicious cycle is ensuring a genuine political transition on the basis of the Geneva communiqué.

Turkey has a commendable track record in terms of countering the threat of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), as well as showing close and transparent cooperation with all countries. A detailed note on our efforts to counter the FTF threat is attached (enclosure II). Ironically, Turkey has intercepted potential FTFs with Russian connections and informed the latter about their deportation numerous times in spite of the lack of cooperation by the Government of the Russian Federation, which is contrary to its own declared interests. Furthermore, news

reports regarding Russians travelling to Syria to join Daesh/ISIL with their Government's approval remain a great concern.

Russia's allegations are directed to shift the focus of the international community's attention from its actions and the real issue, which is ending the conflict in Syria. We invite Russia to live up to the responsibility that Security Council membership entails.

Enclosure I

Civilian casualties due to Russian air strikes in Syria

Date	*Location*	*Casualties*
07.10.2015	Latakia/Turkmen Mountain	7 dead
15-21.10.2015	Idlib/Sarakib, Khirbet El Coz	40 dead/120 wounded
	Latakia/Salma, Kansaba	
	Hama-Idlib/Mansurah, Tel Vasit, Kafer Zeyta, Sheikh Moustafa	
	Aleppo/Han Toman, Zitan, Zerbe, Hanasir, Kafer Jum, Aradah, Zerba	
	Homs/Telbise, Um Sharshuh, Tayr Mallah ve Ghantou	
	Damascus/Cobar, Duma, Marj El Sultan, Deyr Asafir	
22-26.10.2015	Aleppo/Kafer Abid, Balas, Abtin, Karasi, Han Toman, Zerbe, Barkum, Kafer Jum, Han Asal, Anadan	45 dead/55 wounded
	Homs/Telbise, Tayr Mallah, Al Ghankou, Sultan, Allus, Umm Al Karamil, Tayr Mallah, Dar Al Kebire, Rastan	
	Latakia/Salma	
	Idlib/Han Seyhun, Hass	
	Hama/Ikerbat, Latamne, Tel Vasit, Al Mansura, Kafer Zeyta, Kafer Nabuda	
	Damascus/East Gota-Mersaba	
	Daraa/Kafer Shams, Harra, Anter	
31.10.2015	Aleppo/Meskane (Mosque)	50 dead/80 wounded
01.11.2015	Aleppo/Fardos, Sukkari, Seyf El Devle	60 dead/100 wounded
27.11.2015	Aleppo/Azaz	10 dead
29.11.2015	Aleppo/Azaz	12 dead/20 wounded
29.11.2015	Idlib/Ariha	45 dead/60 wounded
07.12.2015	Aleppo/Hulluk	6 dead/14 wounded
13.12.2015	Damascus/East Gota, Duma, Hammuriye, Sakba, Zemelka, Irbin	65 dead/120 wounded
17.12.2015	Aleppo/Azaz	7 dead/8 wounded
20.12.2015	Idlib/City centre	20 dead/30 wounded
22.12.2015	Damascus/East Gota-Bazyna	35 dead/50 wounded
24.12.2015	Aleppo/Rashidin	10 dead
25.12.2015	Aleppo/Azaz (Women and Children's Hospital)	13 dead/20 wounded

Date	*Location*	*Casualties*
26.12.2015	Aleppo/City centre	10 dead
26.12.2015	Idlib/Jerjenaz (Kindergarten)	7 dead/15 wounded
27.12.2015	Homs/Tedmur	15 dead
27.12.2015	Latakia/Al Howr; Aleppo/Al Bab; Homs/Tedmur	10 dead/20 wounded
28.12.2015	Aleppo/Tel Rifat	15 dead/15 wounded
29-30.12.2015	Aleppo/Tel Rifat	20 dead/35 wounded
31.12.2015	Aleppo/Azaz (including women and children)	10 dead/15 wounded
03.01.2016	Aleppo/Azaz	25 dead/10 wounded
04.01.2016	Aleppo/Mare; Latakia/Kurdish Mountain-Salma	6 dead/15 wounded
04.01.2016	Homs/Rastan	2 dead
08.01.2016	Aleppo/Tel Rifat	5 dead/15 wounded
08.01.2016	Rakka (mostly women and children)	10 dead
09.01.2016	Idlib/Maarat El Numan, Han Seyhun, Sarakib	50 dead/110 wounded
10.01.2016	Daraa	6 dead
11.01.2016	Aleppo/Anjarah, Kafer Naha (schools)	30 dead (all children)
11.01.2016	Homs/Rastan, Sheikh Ali, Maarat Al Artik	7 dead/7 wounded
12.01.2016	Aleppo/Hayyan	5 dead/6 wounded
12.01.2016	Aleppo/Munbic	30 dead/40 wounded
14.01.2016	Aleppo/North	7 dead/20 wounded
14.01.2016	Aleppo/Bab	7 dead
15.01.2016	Aleppo/Mayer, Marastel Khan	2 dead
15.01.2016	Aleppo/Munbic	2 dead/5 wounded
16.01.2016	Aleppo/Haritan, Deyr Hafir	2 dead/12 wounded
16.01.2016	Rakka	30 dead
17.01.2016	Homs/Rastan; Aleppo/Deyr Jemal	9 wounded
17.01.2016	Aleppo/Munbic	40 dead
22.01.2016	Idlib/Bab El Hava, Sarmada, Dana	10 dead/20 wounded
22.01.2016	Aleppo/Munbic; Deyr Ez Zor/Buleyl	10 dead
23.01.2016	Aleppo/Bzaa	5 dead

Date	*Location*	*Casualties*
23.01.2016	Deyr Ez Zor	10 dead/20 wounded
24-25.01.2016	Idlib/Salkin	20 dead/25 wounded
24-25.01.2016	Idlib	10 dead/10 wounded
24-25.01.2016	Aleppo/Al Bab, Ahras	10 dead
January 2016 (third week)	Deyr Ez Zor/Hasham	100 dead
28.01.2016	Idlib/Kafer Takkarim; Homs/Ghantu	25 dead/30 wounded
30.01.2016	Ghariyat Al Gharbiyah, Azaz, Umm Sharshuh	11 dead
31.01.2016	Homs/Kissin	20 wounded
01.02.2016	Aleppo/Anadan	4 dead/20 wounded
2-3.02.2016	Aleppo/North	20 dead/30 wounded
04.02.2016	Aleppo/Meshat, Kallaseh, Firdevs, Halluk, Sahaar	30 dead/50 wounded
05.02.2016	Aleppo/Sakhur (Mosque)	15 dead/30 wounded
09.02.2016	Aleppo/Azaz, Kafer Kalbin	15 dead
15.02.2016	Aleppo/Azaz	10 dead/30 wounded
15.02.2016	Idlib/Maraat El Numan, Al Hamidiyah, Sarakib (MSF hospitals)	5 dead/30 wounded

Enclosure II

Turkey's efforts to counter the foreign terrorist fighter threat

Turkey has been countering the threat of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) since 2011 and called for source countries to take necessary legal and administrative measures to prevent the departure and travel of FTFs from their countries.

In this regard, in the framework of national measures, Turkey formed a no-entry list in 2011, which now includes more than 37,000 names; more than 3,000 foreigners have been deported since 2011 and, in the context of measures against FTFs, additional security measures have been introduced, including new risk analysis units at the airports and transport hubs, enhanced passenger screening and security checks in regions adjacent to the Syrian border. Until now, around 7,500 people have been checked by these units, and more than 1,800 of them were denied entry to Turkey.

Turkey officially informs the embassies in Ankara by note verbale about the travel itinerary of foreigners to be deported and who are suspected to be FTFs. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested relevant contact information from embassies in Ankara for urgent notifications.

Since the beginning of 2015, as a result of Turkish law enforcement operations, 2,314 individuals, including 970 foreign nationals, have been detained and 744 persons have been put under arrest due to their affiliation with Daesh/ISIL and El Nusra terrorist groups.

Turkey has encouraged and requested information sharing from all countries to support its efforts against the FTF threat, including the Russian Federation. In February 2015, during the White House Summit against Violent Extremism, the President of the Federal Security Agency of the Russian Federation declared that there were 1,800 FTFs from Russia. At that time, the number of citizens of the Russian Federation in the no-entry list of Turkey was not more than one third of that declared number, revealing the lack of sharing of information and intelligence regarding FTFs from the Russian Federation.

In addition to bilateral cooperation, Turkey also encouraged and called for the use of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to curb the travel of FTFs. In 2014, Turkey received 24 bulletins or diffusion messages for search warrants from the Russian Federation through INTERPOL. In 2015 this number increased to 226.

Despite the lack of cooperation from the Russian Federation to prevent the travel of FTFs, Turkish authorities have not spared any efforts to intercept potential FTFs with Russian connections. As such, since the end of 2014, Turkey has informed the Russian Federation about the deportation of 276 individuals for FTF-related suspicions.

On the other hand, Turkey is concerned to learn about the activities of Russian citizens who, according to the declarations made by Ramzan Kadyrov to State media organs of the Russian Federation, travelled to take part in the Daesh/ISIL terrorist group with the consent of Russian Federation authorities (*The Moscow Times*, 8 February 2016).

Further, recent INTERPOL bulletins also reveal that more than 40 citizens of a Commonwealth of Independent States member country have travelled to Syria to join Daesh/ISIL after a period of residency as migrant workers in the Russian Federation.

Thus, Turkey is concerned with the fact that, due to lack of proper measures against violent extremism and radicalization, as well as inefficient air travel border control for outbound passengers by the Russian Federation, this country has become a hub and an unobstructed transit route for potential foreign terrorist fighters.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2243 (2015), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 October 2016 and requested that I report on its implementation semi-annually and not later than 45 days before its expiration. The present report covers major developments since the issuance of my report of 31 August 2015 (S/2015/667) up to 1 March 2016 and outlines activities undertaken by the Mission in line with its mandate under the relevant Council resolutions, most recently 2243 (2015). An update on the consolidation plan of the Mission is provided in annex I to the present report.

II. Political developments

2. The reporting period was dominated by the political uncertainty generated by the holding of general elections for the Presidency, 20 Senate and 119 Lower House seats, 140 municipal administrations and 570 municipal district councils and assemblies. Following the first round of legislative elections on 9 August, the first round of presidential, second round of legislative and single round of municipal elections were conducted on 25 October. However, the third round vote scheduled for 27 December was postponed repeatedly and is still pending.

3. In preparation for the election of 25 October, the Provisional Electoral Council implemented a series of corrective measures aimed at addressing lessons learned from the vote on 9 August. In addition to technical measures, the Provisional Electoral Council decided to disqualify candidates alleged to have been involved in violence and disruption, and organized reruns in all constituencies where less than 70 per cent of tally sheets had been recovered. On 28 September, the Provisional Electoral Council announced the postponement of local elections from the second round of 25 October to the last electoral round.

4. On 25 October, the elections were held in a generally calm environment, with a reported 26.6 per cent voter turnout and minor incidents. A total of 52 presidential, 196 legislative and over 7,000 municipal candidates ran in the elections. In addition to the deployment of 43,297 accredited national observers, 917,068 accreditation cards were issued to party poll watchers to observe activities in the country's 13,725 polling stations. Fourteen of 20 senators and 92 of the 119 Lower House

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members were sworn in. The international observation missions, including the European Union and the Organization of American States, noted significant technical improvements compared with the first round. Nevertheless, allegations of widespread fraud began to emerge shortly after the vote. Subsequent allegations against electoral officials led to requests by opposition candidates and national observer groups for a verification of the vote.

5. In response to a petition from a group of opposition presidential candidates, on 2 November, the Provisional Electoral Council announced the appointment of a special commission to review 162 complaints in respect of the 25 October vote. The special commission found 116 complaints to be non-receivable and processed the remaining 43, delaying the publication of the preliminary results to 5 November.

6. The final results of the first round of the Presidential elections ranked Jovenel Moïse (Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale) in first place with 511,992 votes (32.81 per cent), followed by Jude Célestin (Ligue Alternative pour le Progrès et l'Emancipation Haïtienne) with 394,390 votes (25.27 per cent). Third-placed Jean-Charles Moïse (Pitit Dessalines) received 222,646 votes (14.27 per cent), with Maryse Narcisse (Fanmi Lavalas) ranking fourth with 110,049 votes (7.05 per cent).

7. Notwithstanding continued vocal protests by the group of eight opposition presidential candidates, including Jude Célestin, only two candidates filed challenges. The ensuing adjudication process revealed some irregularities, resulting in the recommendation to discard 26 tally sheets as well as the removal of the votes for the highest-scoring candidates from the remaining 52 tally sheets.

8. The final results were published on 24 November, confirming the second-round run-off between the two highest-ranked candidates. On 29 November, the group of eight opposition candidates issued a press release stating that free, transparent and democratic elections could not be organized under President Martelly and prompting a boycott of the second round by the Célestin campaign. At that point, objections to the electoral process had progressively grown to include not only all of the opposition, but also important segments of society.

9. On 22 December, President Martelly established an Independent Electoral Evaluation Commission tasked with reviewing the presidential election process. The Commission's report, submitted on 3 January 2016, set out recommendations and noted that the 25 October polls were marred by irregularities benefitting several candidates. It was also concluded in the report that the Provisional Electoral Council had lost its credibility. The technical recommendations, which were subsequently implemented by the Provisional Electoral Council, included measures to improve transparency. In the meantime, on 21 December, the Provisional Electoral Council postponed the third electoral round of 27 December. A new electoral date was eventually set for 24 January 2016.

10. The final legislative results were announced on 18 December 2015. More than 18 political parties won seats in Parliament. While the party of outgoing President Martelly, the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale, won the largest numbers of seats, it fell far short of securing a majority in either chamber. Vérité, the political party of former President René Garcia Préval, also fared well, winning a substantial number of seats in both chambers. No women were elected to either chamber, notwithstanding a constitutional requirement for a 30 per cent quota. The newly elected Lower House members were sworn in on 10 January 2016, followed by the newly elected senators

on 11 January. Both chambers elected their leadership, with Cholzer Chancy as President of the Lower House and Jocelerme Privert as President of the Senate. All the elected parliamentarians took their oath of office, amidst criticism by opposition political parties.

11. On 22 January, two days before the elections, which had been postponed until 24 January, the Provisional Electoral Council suspended electoral operations sine die, citing security concerns following an increasing number of attacks against electoral installations and threats against electoral personnel. Following the postponement, four additional councillors of the Provisional Electoral Council resigned, including council President Pierre Louis Opont, leaving only three councillors of the original nine, rendering the Council inoperative. The postponement also made it impossible to elect a new Head of State before the end of the presidential constitutional mandate, on 7 February 2016.

12. A period of dialogue ensued among various stakeholders, culminating in the signing of an agreement between President Martelly and the Presidents of the two legislative chambers on 5 February. The agreement enabled President Martelly to leave office on 7 February as prescribed by the Constitution and called for the National Assembly to elect, indirectly, a provisional President for a period not exceeding 120 days. The provisional President would then nominate a new Prime Minister and cabinet, revitalize the Provisional Electoral Council and complete the outstanding third electoral round on 24 April 2016, allowing for the inauguration of a new President of the Republic on 14 May 2016.

13. On 14 February, the National Assembly elected Senate and National Assembly President Jocelerme Privert as the provisional President of the Republic, with 77 parliamentary votes against former Senate President Edgard Leblanc's 34 votes, in a two-round process. A formal ceremony was held at the National Palace the next day. On 27 February, Fritz Alphonse Jean was installed as Prime Minister designate.

14. Throughout the electoral process, the Provisional Electoral Council spearheaded the organization and management of the elections, progressively improving technical and operational aspects based on lessons learned. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), MINUSTAH and other international partners provided technical and logistic support to, inter alia, improve the training of electoral staff, including in the vote tabulation centre; broaden the outreach of sensitization campaigns and organize civic education activities; and produce reference material for national police, polling staff and judges on electoral violation. Assistance was also provided to the Provisional Electoral Council in ensuring timely delivery and recovery of electoral material.

15. The Government of Haiti provided the largest share of the financial requirements for the organization of the elections. With a contribution of roughly $23 million — 36 per cent of the $64 million mobilized — the Government remains the largest donor to the electoral basket fund administered by UNDP. In addition, It allocated $3 million to the national police, per round, and provided funds for the operational costs of the electoral council. The postponement of the last round of elections will incur an estimated additional $9 million for operational and logistics support through UNDP and UNOPS, depending on decisions taken by a new electoral council.

III. Security developments

16. The security environment remained influenced by the electoral process. While the 25 October polls unfolded relatively peacefully, the reporting period saw a surge in protests, some accompanied by violence. Generally, criminality remained at the same levels as those in the reporting periods covered by my two previous reports, including in the Departments from which the military withdrew in 2015.

17. Fewer security incidents were reported on 25 October than during the polls of 9 August; 33 election-related incidents, targeting voting centres mainly concentrated in the south-east, north and south, occurred on 25 October, compared with 202 election-related incidents on 9 August reported nationwide. The 13 per cent voting centre closure rate seen in the 9 August polls, following security-related issues, dropped to 2 per cent for the 25 October polls. No casualties were reported, whereas a total of seven fatalities were linked to the elections of 9 August. Election security for the 25 October polls was primarily provided by the Haitian National Police, which were present in all 10 Departments, with 7,387 personnel deployed. This represented a 10 per cent increase compared with the 9 August polls. The increased deployment allowed for a more visible and pre-emptive posture, resulting in a relatively higher number of arrests on 25 October (248) compared with the previous round (132). MINUSTAH police and military components were called upon twice to support the national police.

18. A peak in violence was reported in the days surrounding the signature of the political accord of 5 February. After a group of armed individuals associated with former armed forces paraded in Port-au-Prince on 5 February, one man in military uniform was killed in a confrontation with demonstrators. On 6 February, several attacks in the West Department against the main market area in Port-au-Prince, a police station in Arcahaie, a bus and two bank branches in Cabaret were reported. On 7 February, armed confrontations between rival gangs erupted in Cité Soleil (West Department) and violent demonstrations were reported in Port-au-Prince (West Department) following the conclusion of the National Assembly session. MINUSTAH military and police pre-emptively redeployed to the capital from the regions to provide additional and visible deterrence capacity to the national police were able to manage the protests. The election of the provisional President on 14 February concluded without any reports of major incidents.

19. Crime statistics for the period from 1 September 2015 to 1 March 2016, collected by the national police and MINUSTAH, indicated 567 reported homicides. In comparison, 486 homicides were registered between 1 March and 31 August 2015 and 538 between 1 September 2014 and 1 March 2015. Nearly 83 per cent of the 567 homicides remained concentrated in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, almost half of which were reportedly gang-related. In total, 44 kidnappings were registered, compared with 29 between 1 March and 31 August 2015 and 29 between 1 September 2014 and 1 March 2015. Reported cases of rape totalled 218, indicating greater stability following the 223 cases reported between 1 March and 31 August 2015 and the 220 cases reported between 1 September 2014 and 1 March 2015. The Ministry for the Status of Women and Women's Rights suggested that the numbers may have been higher owing to underreporting, in particular in Cité Soleil (West Department), where gangs were reportedly the main perpetrators.

20. The total number of public protests was 689, of which 275 were reported to have elements of violence ranging from the use of road barricades, destruction of property and throwing of stones, to assaults against police officers and shootings. Those numbers indicate a substantial increase from 399 (of which 151 were violent) during the period from 1 March to 31 August 2015 and a more significant rise from 215 (of which 104 were violent) during the period from 1 September 2014 to 1 March 2015, reflecting the volatility of the current reporting period. The West Department remained the most affected, with 52 per cent (361) of the 689 recorded events, followed by the North Department with 9 per cent and the South Department with 8 per cent. Protests were generally small-scale; an estimated 84 per cent (576 events) involved fewer than 300 persons. Another 11 per cent (75 events) ranged from 300 to 1,000 persons, while 5 per cent (38 events) involved more than 1,000 protesters. Election-related protests totalled 318 events, representing 46 per cent of the 689 reported protests, surpassing the 136 triggered by socioeconomic grievances.

21. The police component of MINUSTAH (see annex II) assisted the national police in crime reduction operations and checkpoints by jointly performing 2,372 checkpoints, 3,254 foot patrols and 16,176 vehicle patrols and conducting 47 joint operations, including 41 in Cité Soleil (West Department). Military peacekeepers (see annex III) conducted 3,892 operations, 452 of which were joint patrols with the national police and the United Nations police. In addition, the military component conducted 18 platoon-sized quick reaction force deployments to 14 different communities in seven departments, using MINUSTAH aviation assets.

22. On 30 December 2015, MINUSTAH found that two of its police officers had been killed by gunshot in their residences in Cap-Haïtien. The investigation, conducted by the national police, with assistance from the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and MINUSTAH, is ongoing.

IV. Rule of law and human rights

23. MINUSTAH and United Nations country team capacity-building activities in support of the justice and human rights system aimed at enhancing acceptance of the rule of the law and strengthening relevant institutions and mechanisms. Support focused on specific institutions, including the police, the prison service, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, courts and prosecutors in three departments (North, South and West), legal aid offices, the national ombudsperson and the Inspectorate General of the national police.

A. Rule of law

24. In the last year of the implementation of the 2012-2016 development plan, the national police has demonstrated both its commitment and its ability to advance its capabilities and increasingly provide full security to the Haitian people, evidenced, inter alia, during the electoral period and in its improved crowd control capacity. The Government of Haiti, through the Superior Council of the National Police, has continued its support to the national police and has demonstrated leadership in ensuring coherence in the provision of international assistance. Together with national and international stakeholders, MINUSTAH continued supporting the

implementation of the priorities of the 2012-2016 development plan, which informs the assistance of the United Nations and international partners. Less than 10 months before its completion, 60 per cent of the five-year plan has been accomplished, with 10 activities completed, 42 activities at an advanced stage, while preparing the transition for the 18 others that are in their early stages of implementation. While tangible progress has been achieved, further improvement remains necessary, including in the fields of criminal investigation procedures, firearms control, institutional policies, police intelligence, the use of force procedures, budget execution and strategic planning.

25. The total strength of the police has decreased slightly, from the 11,900 officers reported in my previous report (S/2015/667) to 11,728 officers, including 998 women, resulting in an overall police-to-population ratio of 1.07 per 1,000 citizens. This reduction was mainly due to the dismissal of officers, voluntary resignations and officers killed on duty as well as off duty. The police academy started training its twenty-sixth class, with 1,506 cadets (including 190 women), in the autumn of 2015. Another class of 1,500 recruits will be trained during the second half of 2016. The objective is to reach close to 15,000 officers by the end of 2016 and a ratio of 1.32 per 1,000 inhabitants.

26. Twelve police infrastructure facilities were constructed or reconstructed, and approximately 1,000 handheld radios for communications and 161 vehicles, were provided to the national police. The Inspectorate General of the national police received 275 complaints, conducted 303 investigations and submitted 246 reports with recommendations for sanctions to the Director General, resulting the expulsion of 27 police officers. The Inspectorate General continued holding monthly internal meetings and press conferences to enhance awareness of its work.

27. With support from MINUSTAH and donors, the community policing and outreach approach developed in Croix-des-Bouquets has been expanded to reach other areas. A total of 57 national police officers have received basic training in community policing principles. The model was launched at the Fort National commissariat In Delmas, MINUSTAH trained 88 national police officers in crime reduction in public schools. The establishment of a sexual and gender-based violence) investigations unit within the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police is ongoing. To date, 19 police investigators of sexual and gender-based violence have completed specialized training, with more training scheduled for 2016. The standard operating procedures for such investigations is awaiting endorsement by the leadership of the national police.

28. Through its community violence reduction programme, MINUSTAH has continued to work closely with urban communities, selected Haitian ministries and the United Nations country team. In the Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods of Martissant and Cité Soleil, which are particularly affected by gang violence, 1,919 vulnerable women have received medical examinations and psychosocial support through community violence reduction programmes. Funding in the amount of $3 million has been approved for 19 new projects. In addition, seven projects worth $1 million were launched with partners, targeting some 16,420 direct beneficiaries, 30 per cent of whom are women).

29. MINUSTAH provided financial and technical support to legal aid offices in Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes, targeting detainees in pre-trial detention. As a result, 980 cases were processed, of which 46 per cent were closed, resulting in

340 releases. In Port-au-Prince, the five offices supported by the Mission have dealt with 3,929 cases, resulting in the release of 1,462 persons. Nevertheless, owing to a continuously high number of detainees admitted to prisons, overcrowding remains a serious challenge. Following training seminars organized jointly by the Secretary of State for Justice and MINUSTAH, an on-call duty system for judges was implemented to ensure their continuous availability. This allowed for immediate court hearings, thereby expediting the processing of criminal files in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien.

30. MINUSTAH and international partners continued to support legal reform, including by facilitating the finalization of the criminal procedure code. Similar to the drafting of the penal code, United Nations and international partners supported 48 consultative workshops on the draft criminal procedure code for actors in the legal system and civil society institutions in Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Port-au-Prince, Hinche and Les Cayes. Both the penal code and criminal procedure code have yet to be adopted by Parliament.

31. Since my previous report, the rate of pre-trial detention has decreased only slightly, from 71.5 to 71.0 per cent. MINUSTAH advised the Penitentiary Administration Directorate on the content of the prison health-care policy, which is expected to be mainstreamed into the national health-care policy. The 2014-2016 development plan for the national prison service, developed with advice from MINUSTAH, reflects the Government's commitment to advancing prison reforms. MINUSTAH launched a social reintegration initiative in the Cap-Haïtien prison and a school programme for minors in conflict with the law in the women's prison at Pétionville and the Centre de rééducation des mineurs en conflit avec la loi. MINUSTAH also assisted the Penitentiary Administration Directorate in developing tools and training to standardize prisoner record management, facilitate access to prisoner data by judicial authorities and improve prison infrastructure at Cabaret, Fort Liberté, Hinche and Petit-Goâve while working with partners on the construction of four new prisons funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the United States Department of State. One new prison has been completed, while the remaining three are expected to be completed within the next six months. Prison staffing has nonetheless remained a critical problem, with only 1,498 personnel for a prison population of 11,081.

B. Human rights

32. The human rights of detainees continued to be of serious concern to the Mission. Only 3 of the 17 detention facilities under the jurisdiction of the Penitentiary Administration offer slightly more than 1 square metre per detainee, well below international standards; the 4,544 detainees in the national penitentiary are crammed in at three persons per square metre. These conditions, coupled with the fact that detainees spend more than 23 hours a day confined to their cell, amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, as indicated by the Human Rights Committee in its concluding observations on the initial report of Haiti on the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/1). An important number of the detainees have been unlawfully arrested, and most pretrial detainees have had their right to a fair trial within a reasonable period irremediably compromised.

33. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH received allegations of human rights abuses by the national police special units for crowd control and interventions. Investigation by MINUSTAH suggests that excessive and unreasonable force was sporadically used, along with lethal weapons, during otherwise legitimate operations, to restore public order and to search for and arrest suspects in Arcahaie and Port-au-Prince in September and October 2015. There was also evidence of intimidation of the population by the police. The Inspectorate General of the national police and MINUSTAH have investigated a video published on social media in which national police officers are seen severely mishandling two men. The Inspectorate General is following up with recommendations and corrective measures. A clear normative framework notwithstanding, disciplinary and judicial investigations into allegations of unlawful use of force by the national police remained limited. While the Inspectorate General has responded to formal requests, it has been reluctant to open ex-officio investigations.

34. On 15 January 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child examined the second and third periodic reports of Haiti on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC/C/HTI/2-3). It addressed in particular issues relating to children of detained parents, child trafficking and cases of exploitation of children for transactional sex by United Nations peacekeepers. The Committee adopted its concluding observations on 29 January.

35. While the exploitation of children is a crime under national legislation, the practice of placing children in domestic service (*restaveks*) is widespread. According to a 2015 study led by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, more than 200,000 children are exploited in this manner, and many are subjected to physical, emotional and sexual abuse. The Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends that Haiti criminalize the practice, for which no one has been prosecuted to date.

V. Institutional support and strengthening of State authority

36. MINUSTAH continues its work, in close collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, in support of decentralization and local government and in preparing newly elected mayors and municipal councils expected to take office in 2016. Municipal authorities continue to demonstrate resilience in the face of political uncertainty at the national level. As at 31 January, all 140 municipalities had been able to formulate their own budgets; the vast majority had developed complementary action plans and are leading on local disaster response coordination mechanisms.

37. MINUSTAH supported the municipalities in updating the "mayors' manual" and the municipal budget and in surveying more than two thirds of some 30,000 properties in Les Cayes (south) and Jérémie (Grande'Anse) by investigating officers from the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government from September 2015 to January 2016, and through the operationalization of a new digital financial management system. MINUSTAH also supported the training of 114 key municipal personnel from 16 different communes in the North and North-East Departments in planning, accounting, conflict management and gender mainstreaming. This same training is currently being replicated in 11 communes in the South. Meanwhile,

MINUSTAH continues to advocate for statutory protection and guarantees for key municipal workers.

38. Quick-impact projects, totalling $2,445,969 invested from 1 July 2015 to 15 January 2016, have focused on the reconstruction of local court houses, police stations and the provision of public lighting. Projects have also supported livelihoods, the provision of clean drinking water for 500,000 beneficiaries, and the fight against cholera.

39. At the request of the Prime Minister, MINUSTAH supported the Provisional Electoral Council in organizing 82 pre-electoral forums with local authorities, political parties and candidates, civil society, women's groups, young people and local media between August and December, with over 100 civil society organizations per department.

VI. Update and activities on humanitarian and development needs

A. Humanitarian activities

40. While the country's humanitarian situation remains complex, the decline in humanitarian funding from $155 million in 2014 to $55 million in 2015, according to the financial tracking system of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, undermines the ability of the United Nations to support the Government and civil society in the provision of relief.

41. From 1 January to 31 December 2015, the Ministry of Public Health and Population reported 36,045 suspected cholera cases and 322 deaths. These figures exceed the 27,388 suspected cholera cases reported in 2014. However, with a total of 13,018 cases during the last three months of 2015 compared with 18,444 during the same period in 2014, the last quarter of 2015 registered the lowest rate of outbreaks since the beginning of the epidemic. Improved surveillance, rapid alerts and a coordinated response by Haitian authorities, the United Nations and other international partners have permitted a reversal of the increase in cases.

42. The High-level Committee for the Elimination of Cholera, co-chaired by the Minister of Health and my Special Representative, met on 21 December. Participants advocated for a continuation of the national strategy on cholera, combining rapid response to outbreaks with continuous investment in water, health and sanitation infrastructure. The Haitian health authorities view this strategy as a priority for all water-borne and infectious diseases. Funding for the national strategy on cholera and for the continued provision of a response to cases, albeit a priority, is declining.

43. Three years of drought, compounded by El Niño in 2015, have exacerbated the poverty and hunger of many households. Alternative livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms have been exhausted. According to the results of an emergency food security assessment conducted by the World Food Programme and the Government in December 2015, 1.5 million Haitians are currently severely food insecure, which is more than double the number from six months ago. A recent study conducted by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Government revealed that, in some areas, malnutrition rates are above emergency levels. The 2015 spring harvest, which accounts for over 50 per cent of national

annual production, fell below average, with losses of up to 70 per cent in some areas. Without rain in the 2016 spring season, farmers will lose their third consecutive harvest, on which they would normally depend to feed their families.

44. The reporting period also saw the continuation of the issue of the status of Haitians or persons of Haitian origin living in the Dominican Republic. From July 2015 through mid-January 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) registered more than 69,000 persons returning to Haitian territory; 42,404 were recorded as spontaneous returns, while 15,747 were deported officially.

45. The situation of many returnees remains difficult, owing to insufficient reception capacity; limited institutional and financial resources on the Haitian side of the border; and tensions in border communities, which has led to the establishment of informal settlements. In the area of Anse-à-Pitre (South-East), 2,203 registered persons have settled in six makeshift camps in dire conditions, prompting the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti to urge the Haitian authorities to take immediate steps to improve living conditions. A recent inter-agency vulnerability assessment confirmed the urgent need for humanitarian and protection assistance, which should be focused on legal aid and access to clean water, food and medicine. MINUSTAH and UNICEF, in coordination with other partners, have monitored and assisted cases of unaccompanied minors deported from the Dominican Republic. Meanwhile, IOM is working on voluntary relocation options.

46. According to IOM, six years after the earthquake of January 2010, 59,720 individuals remain internally displaced in 37 sites and camp-like settlements in Haiti, often in precarious conditions. Between July and December 2015, return programmes offering rental subsidies led to the closure of 10 sites and the relocation of about 578 internally displaced households. Funding is available to resettle, on a voluntary basis, all 7,000 internally displaced families who remain under tents and in precarious shelters by the end of 2016.

B. Development activities

47. The current political crisis is affecting development spending. In the absence of a Government that is capable of making financial commitments, international lending and development programmes have been negatively affected. Nevertheless, based on the recommendations of the regional United Nations Development Group, which visited Haiti in November 2015, the elaboration of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework has begun and will continue throughout 2016, in consultation with the national authorities that are expected to emerge from the ongoing electoral process, civil society and international technical and financial partners.

48. Preliminary figures show that economic growth for the fiscal year ending on 30 September is only 1.7 per cent. This reflects the impact of political uncertainty, the drought and decreased agricultural production, as well as the slowdown in public investment owing to declining donor flows, in particular the Petrocaribe programme. Inflation has reached double digits, led by a 20 per cent rise in prices for domestically produced foods. Under these difficult circumstances, the country's economic policy is aimed at stabilizing the situation, with the Government keeping spending to the bare minimum and maintaining tight monetary conditions, but at the

cost of continued loss of international reserves. Speculation against the gourde, especially given the deteriorating political environment, has led to a 15 per cent drop in the currency since late September.

49. The United Nations and its partners continue to work on social issues, including HIV/AIDS and child protection. MINUSTAH, United Nations agencies, the Government and civil society groups working with young people have signed a charter of commitments to engage young people in the HIV response. The United Nations country team has also been advocating for human rights, in particular the rights of women, programmes against gender-based violence and the reform of educational policy in Haiti.

VII. Consolidation and strategic planning

50. MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team are working on a joint transition plan that identifies areas in which further support by international partners, including the United Nations, is required and outlines a road map for the progressive disengagement of the Mission from functions that can be assumed by the Government of Haiti or other partners. As joint work on transition progresses, it will also feed into the strategic assessment mission that the Security Council requested me to conduct (see resolution 2243 (2015)) in order to present to the Council recommendations on the future presence and role of the United Nations in Haiti.

51. The transition plan is informed by both a situational analysis and an institutional capacity assessment. The situational analysis is intended to establish a shared understanding of the operational environment that informs United Nations planning and programming interventions, while the institutional capacity assessment is an analysis of the progress made towards strengthening Haiti's institutional capacities as they relate to mandated activities, with a particular focus on the development of the police, electoral capacity-building, the rule of law and human rights, and good governance. The institutional capacity analysis will also assess the sustainability of key institutions and lead to the formulation of recommendations on future support to ensure long-term viability and local ownership. In the absence of gender-specific benchmarks, special attention has been placed on including a gender analysis for each of the transition components.

52. As part of transition planning, a team from the global focal point for the rule of law deployed in October to identify a common workplan, staffing and operational arrangements for the establishment of an integrated interim programme in 2016 to support the rule of law, police and penal system. The integrated MINUSTAH-United Nations country team programme will allow for greater efficiency and prepare a smooth transfer of activities, when appropriate.

53. To support the national police, MINUSTAH plans to focus efforts on the implementation of the current five-year plan and on developing the road map for the 2017-2021 plan. In the light of increased police capacities, international and MINUSTAH support will concentrate on capacity-building, including continuous advanced and specialized training, with a focus on crime reduction initiatives in vulnerable areas with a community approach. The success of the transition process is dependent upon the continued support of police-contributing countries, through the deployment of skilled individual police officers and formed police units.

VIII. Conduct and discipline

54. In line with the initiatives set out in my report on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (A/70/729), MINUSTAH has established a dedicated task force and continues its efforts to raise awareness among personnel on the zero-tolerance policy. MINUSTAH also continues to conduct risk assessment exercises aimed at identifying and addressing factors leading to sexual exploitation and abuse. Moreover, the Mission has established a community-based mechanism for reporting alleged misconduct and sexual exploitation and abuse committed by Mission personnel.

IX. Financial aspects

55. By its resolution 69/299, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $380.4 million for the maintenance of MINUSTAH for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016.

56. As at 15 February 2016, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $191.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at the same date amounted to $3,572.4 million.

57. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 31 October 2015, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 30 September 2015, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

X. Observations and recommendations

58. Haiti and its people have made noteworthy progress towards political stability, despite considerable challenges, including the human and material devastation wrought by the earthquake of 2010. The current electoral and institutional uncertainty is regrettable. Yet, periods of instability, however unfortunate, remain a possibility in all political systems. The ability of Haitian actors to overcome the current political uncertainty will provide a clear indication of the country's progress in terms of political stability and the entrenchment of a democratic culture.

59. Notwithstanding the efforts of Haitian institutions to hold long overdue elections, only two of the three planned electoral rounds were held. Following the polls of 9 August, during which there were some localized instances of violence, the relatively peaceful polls of 25 October resulted in the election of 14 senators and 92 Lower Chamber deputies. Meanwhile, political and security tensions, fuelled by allegations of fraud, in particular with respect to the presidential vote, persisted for months. With the exception of the pro-Government candidate who won the first round, the electoral process was criticized by both opposition presidential candidates and civil society. In contrast, all elected legislative candidates, independent of their political persuasion, took their oaths of office on the constitutional date of 11 January 2016, forming the fiftieth legislature following a year without a functioning Parliament.

60. Mounting tensions relating to allegations of fraud resulted in the third and final rounds of the elections, including the presidential runoff, being postponed twice by the Provisional Electoral Council, the second time sine die in response to increasing security concerns. This political impasse brought the country to the brink of a governance vacuum, which was averted by the agreement of 5 February reached between outgoing President Martelly and the Presidents of the two chambers of Parliament, ahead of the expiry of the presidential term on 7 February 2016. The agreement, which reflects the spirit of the Constitution, provided a road map for institutional continuity through the election by Parliament of a provisional President for a transitional period of 120 days, the appointment of a Prime Minister and the completion of the electoral process. Throughout, my Special Representative and the Secretariat, as well as other members of the international community, including regional and subregional organizations, used their good offices to support the negotiations among the national actors. This stands as testimony to the international community's commitment to Haiti.

61. Now that an agreement aimed at avoiding a governance vacuum has been reached, I call, once again, upon all Haitian actors to continue to work together in the spirit of the Constitution of Haiti and to implement the agreement of 5 February, finding Haitian solutions to Haitian problems. I call upon all political stakeholders to immediately take, in good faith, all steps necessary to ensure the completion of the electoral process initiated in 2015. With the election of a provisional President on 14 February and the designation of a Prime Minister, it is now incumbent upon all of the country's institutions, including the provisional President, to ensure that the provisions of the agreement are implemented in full, in the same spirit of compromise and within the agreed time frames. I welcome the efforts by the provisional President thus far to ensure the designation of a Prime Minister and the parallel efforts to revitalize the Provisional Electoral Council. The swift renewal of the Provisional Electoral Council is a necessary precondition for the completion of the elections in a manner that reflects the will of the people. More generally, the continued commitment of all political stakeholders to identify Haitian-owned consensual solutions to the country's problems is essential to longer-term unity and stability in the country.

62. I wish to underscore the need for all stakeholders to exercise restraint. I appeal to their constituencies to act responsibly in order to preserve security and stability during this delicate transitional period. Haiti has been able to maintain a largely peaceful environment despite tensions associated with the political situation. However, the progress made so far remains fragile and could be susceptible to setbacks. I commend the performance of the national police, which operated successfully during this period, with limited need for assistance from the MINUSTAH police and military components. I also welcome the continued police recruitment and training efforts, which mean that the target of 15,000 national police will be within reach or will be met by the end of 2016.

63. Haiti cannot afford political instability during the current period of negative economic trends, characterized by low economic growth and decreasing levels of investment. The country continues to be vulnerable to humanitarian crises, including drought, insufficient water, health and sanitation infrastructure; and the presence of diarrheal disease. These crises have an even greater impact on the quarter of the population living in extreme poverty, the 59,000 persons displaced by the earthquake of 2010 who still remain in internally displaced person sites and

camp-like settlements, and those who have returned or been deported back to Haiti. I urge continued attention to those issues, with a special focus on the food situation arising from the combined effect of three years of drought and a particularly strong El Niño.

64. The increase in cholera cases in 2015 is cause for concern. I support the efforts by the Haitian authorities to combat cholera together with all waterborne and infectious diseases through the combination of a rapid response to outbreaks and continuous investment in water, health and sanitation infrastructure. The low rate of outbreaks in the last quarter of 2015 is promising. However, a decline in humanitarian funding is hampering the ability of the United Nations to assist Haitian efforts. The elimination of this epidemic is not only possible but an imperative, and I call upon Member States to support the ongoing efforts.

65. I remain concerned about the slow progress towards strengthening the rule of law and ending impunity. Notwithstanding important steps such as the finalization of the draft criminal procedure code, the implementation of an on-call duty system for judges and immediate trial hearings, numerous deficiencies in the judicial system continue to impact human rights, notably the right to a fair trial within a reasonable period and humane detention conditions. I call upon the authorities to undertake legal reform through the appropriate legislative, executive and administrative measures. I urge them to strengthen the country's rule of law institutions in order to ensure justice and to promote and protect the human rights of the Haitian people. This remains a critical element of the consolidation of stability in the country.

66. In view of the current political uncertainty in Haiti, I propose that a strategic assessment, as stipulated by the Security Council in its resolution 2243 (2015), be carried out following the completion of the interrupted electoral process. I hope that the process will be completed peacefully and within the time frames outlined in the agreement of 5 February, allowing for a positive assessment that could trigger a significant evolution of the United Nations presence in Haiti. Mindful of developments on the ground, it is my intention to submit recommendations to the Security Council on the future of MINUSTAH ahead of the expiration of its mandate in October 2016.

67. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative, Sandra Honoré, for her service in support of Haiti at this delicate juncture. I would also like to thank the women and men of MINUSTAH, troop- and police-contributing countries and the United Nations country team and partners for their continued dedication and commitment to stability and development in Haiti. I also wish to pay tribute to the late Force Commander of MINUSTAH, Lieutenant General José Luiz Jaborandy Junior.

Annex I

Progress in the consolidation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

1. An update on the progress made towards the implementation of the consolidation plan for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as set out in my report to the Security Council of 8 March 2013 (S/2013/139) is set out below.

Police development

2. The twenty-sixth Haitian National Police promotion is expected to graduate in April 2016. Currently 1,489 cadets out of the initial 1,506, including 186 women, remain at the school. The recruitment process for the twenty-seventh promotion continued, and 7,714 applicants, including 1,084 women, underwent physical tests and interviews.

3. The National Police Academy is continuing the executive development training programme, with support from international donors, for an additional two years (2015-2017). A strategic plan for the Academy (2015-2018) has also been developed. On 11 December 2015, a total of 31 commissioners from the third and fourth cohorts graduated from the Academy.

4. The Emergency Call Centre project "114", estimated at a total cost of $11 million, is operational. With international donor support, 15 call workstations have been installed in the West Department, which suffers from the highest crime rate in the country.

5. A total of 12 national police buildings have been constructed or renovated, and 161 new vehicles and motorcycles and two high-speed boats have been added to the transport fleet of the national police, either through donor contributions or financed by the Government of Haiti. Two technical committees have been set up to audit and record all logistics in order to develop the logistics forecast for 2015-2016 and improve the procurement system.

6. Specialized training continued for crowd control units, mainly outside the metropolitan area, with 123 police officers trained by national police instructors, under the supervision of the United Nations police. In cooperation with international stakeholders, MINUSTAH provided training for 150 judicial police officers in criminal investigation, human rights, crime scene management, the penal code, interview and interrogation techniques and ballistics. Another 43 police officers received specialized training in interviewing children and sexual crime investigations.

7. The development of specialized capacities within the corrections system included the development of a prison health-care policy draft; the development of the 2014-2016 action plan for the Penitentiary Administration Directorate; the ongoing implementation of the 2014-2016 strategic plan for the Penitentiary Administration Directorate and social reintegration programmes in three prisons; the development and adoption of various procedures in prisons (for example, emergency plans and security checklists); the training of senior Penitentiary Administration Directorate officials on the application of policies and directives;

capacity-building programmes in prison management; the standardization of prisoners' records; support to the fight against cholera and tuberculosis; and the monitoring of the construction of four new prisons.

8. On 1 October 2015, the budget of the national police for the fiscal year 2015-2016 developed by the joint committee with MINUSTAH came into effect. The allocation of $212.9 million includes an increase of 7 per cent owing primarily to a salary increase of 6 to 10 per cent and the incorporation of 1,500 new officers.

Electoral capacity-building

9. Following the elections of 9 August and in accordance with the electoral calendar published in March 2015, the Provisional Electoral Council organized the second round of parliamentary elections and the first round of presidential and municipal elections on 25 October. For those elections, the Provisional Electoral Council implemented recommendations that resulted in substantial improvements in its operations, the training of poll workers and voter sensitization. As a result, the European Union and Organization of American States election observation missions concluded that the elections of 25 October had considerably improved on the first round and were conducted competently. While the second round of presidential elections of 27 December 2015 and 24 January 2016 did not take place, the new parliamentarians took their oaths of office on 11 January 2016, as constitutionally mandated.

10. MINUSTAH supported the national police in implementing the necessary changes to its electoral deployment for the pending elections. On 25 October, 7,357 national police officers, including 2,050 redeployed as reinforcements from Port-au-Prince, along with an extra 194 vehicles and 427 motorcycles to supplement transportation resources, were deployed. The General Inspectorate of the national police held a large awareness campaign on the role of police officers during the elections and deployed a team to each department to monitor performance. During the first electoral round, 7 people lost their lives and 25 were injured; during the second round, three people were injured and there were no fatalities. In August 2015, 202 polling centres were affected by violence and had to partially, temporarily or permanently close, compared with 33 in October and 2 on 22 January 2016 during the distribution of electoral material.

11. Adherence to constitutional timelines for holding elections was partially achieved, with the installation of the newly elected Lower Chamber and Senate in accordance with the Constitution. The postponement of the second round of presidential elections did not allow for the installation of a new President on 7 February 2016, the date prescribed by the Constitution.

12. The establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council will not be possible until all three branches of power are seated and operational in order to nominate their representatives to be appointed by presidential order.

13. The Government of Haiti was the largest contributor to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) basket fund for electoral operations ($23.2 million, or 36 per cent). Taking into account electoral expenditures relating to security ($9 million) and the functioning of the Provisional Electoral Council ($6 million), Haiti has considerably increased its share of financing of electoral operations since 2010.

14. The transfer of knowledge from MINUSTAH, UNDP and the United nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to the Provisional Electoral Council was accomplished, focusing efforts on increasing national capacities in planning, coordination and decision-making, and prioritized training for key positions in the electoral council. During the current electoral cycle, the Provisional Electoral Council assumed greater responsibility for logistic and technical operations compared with 2010, when MINUSTAH managed all logistics. Transportation support is still required, however, by MINUSTAH and UNOPS, and there is a continuous need for technical support for the next electoral cycle.

15. The national police, in coordination with MINUSTAH, developed an integrated security plan for the elections. Adjustments following the August elections resulted in a positive performance on 25 October. The national police played a key role in preventing pre- and post-electoral conflict and arrested perpetrators and instigators of incidents of violence and vandalism. The management of the 25 October elections has substantially increased morale and self-confidence within the national police, revealing its capacity to ensure a peaceful electoral process with minimal support from MINUSTAH.

Rule of law and human rights

16. The Superior Council of the Judiciary held a course on efficient management of judicial processes. The executive branch authorized the renewal of the terms of the serving judges and the appointment of 80 new judges. The joint vetting commission submitted 47 investigative reports. MINUSTAH is providing legal, technical, logistical and financial support for this work and for the mechanisms and procedure relating to the evaluation of the judges.

17. Currently, women comprise less than 10 per cent of the judiciary. There is only one female judge appointed to the Supreme Court and one female Assistant Prosecutor. In an effort to address long-term gender imbalance, the current class at the School of Magistrates comprises 33 female trainees, amounting to 50 per cent of the class.

18. In August 2015, UNDP completed a comprehensive institutional review of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes, with a detailed follow-up plan for capacity-building and institutional strengthening. Funding for this work, however, has not yet been secured. Some financial and programmatic support from the Mission budget is foreseen in the proposed rule of law joint interim programme 2016-17. Moreover, a new President of the Court was elected in October, and the Mission expects to increase its engagement with the President and the Court once the electoral period is completed.

19. The joint technical committee in charge of the penal reform completed the drafting of the criminal procedure code and the Presidential Commission on Justice Reform submitted it to the executive branch.

20. MINUSTAH supported legal aid offices of Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes resulting in 833 cases processed, 40 per cent of which closed, resulting in 224 acquittals. In Port-au-Prince, the five supported offices processed 3,125 cases, resulting in 1,157 people released and 57 per cent of cases closed.

21. Since September 2015, MINUSTAH has been providing support to Haiti's Office of the Ombudsperson through the placement in the Office of an international

expert responsible for providing recommendations on the strategic plan for the period 2016-2019. The Office approved an interim report with recommendations, which was submitted in December 2015.

22. Financial allocations through the State budget continue to fall short of the Office's operational needs, as recommended, inter alia, by the Human Rights Committee in 2014, preventing the establishment of a women's protection unit.

23. With the support of MINUSTAH, the number of certified police officers has reached 7,418. Another 2,292 are currently being vetted.

24. The police Inspectorate General received 275 complaints, conducted 303 investigations and submitted 246 reports with recommendations for sanctions to the Director General.

25. On 2 October, the Director General of the national police signed a gender directive formalizing the mandate and structure of the national body "Coordination nationale des affaires féminines, des questions de genre et des violences sexuelles". This marked the first significant step towards the implementation of a gender policy within the national police.

Key governance issues

26. The ability of municipal and departmental authorities to implement basic administrative and financial procedures has improved, with all 140 municipalities able to implement financial procedures for budget formation. Two new pilot programmes were established at the municipal level on fiscal mobilization tools and digital tax systems. The ability of authorities to administer municipal and regional coordination forums independently has progressed, and disaster response meetings are held monthly.

Annex II

Composition and strength of the police of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, as at 22 February 2016

	United Nations police officers		*Formed police units*	
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Argentina	1	8		
Bangladesh		9	86	213
Benin	1	54		
Brazil		5		
Burkina Faso	10	45		
Burundi	1	1		
Cameroon	14	5		
Canada	17	64		
Chad		8		
Chile	1	10		
Columbia	1	4		
Egypt		27		
El Salvador		12		
Ethiopia		2		
France	1	7		
Ghana	1	8		
Guinea		1		
India		15		439
Indonesia	2	6		
Jamaica		1		
Jordan		26		319
Madagascar	5	26		
Mali	1	9		
Nepal	4	31	13	127
Niger	2	24		
Nigeria		2		
Norway	1	1		
Pakistan				140
Paraguay		1		
Philippines	1	25		
Romania	4	24		
Russian Federation	2	4		
Rwanda	29	4	25	135
Senegal		17	11	149
Serbia		4		

Country	*United Nations police officers*		*Formed police units*	
	Women	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Slovakia	1	5		
Spain		3		
Sri Lanka		13		
Thailand	2	5		
Togo	2	19		
Tunisia		3		
Turkey		32		
United States of America	3	22		
Uruguay		5		
Vanuatu		1		
Yemen		23		
Subtotal	**107**	**621**	**135**	**1 522**
Subtotal, United Nations police: 728				
Subtotal, formed police: 1 657				
Total: 2 385				

Annex III

Countries providing military staff and contingents to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, as at 22 February 2016

	Staff officers		*Troops*		
Country	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*	*Total*
Argentina		6	22	44	72
Bangladesh		1		110	111
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)		1			1
Brazil[a]		12	25	943	980
Canada	1	4			5
Chile		4	12	375	391
Ecuador		1			1
El Salvador				44	44
Guatemala		2	6	46	54
Honduras				47	47
Jordan		3			3
Mexico		3		3	6
Nepal		3			3
Paraguay		1	5	77	83
Peru		3	8	152	163
Philippines		2	13	122	137
Sri Lanka		3			3
United States of America		5			5
Uruguay		5	11	229	245
Total	**1**	**59**	**102**	**2 192**	**2 354**

[a] The Force Commander is employed on a United Nations contract and is therefore not reflected in the troop strength.


MINUSTAH
February 2016
Force Headquarters
Battalion boundary
International boundary
Departmental boundary
National capital
Departmental capital
Town, village
Main road
Secondary road
Airport
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
CUBA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CARIBBEAN SEA
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
NORD - OUEST
NORD
NORD - EST
ARTIBONITE
CENTRE
GRANDE - ANSE
SUD
NIPPES
OUEST
SUD - EST
PORT-AU-PRINCE
MINUSTAH
BRAZIL
PHILIPPINES
BANGLADESH
CHILE
PARAGUAY
BRAZIL
ARGENTINA
GUATEMALA
JORDAN 1
JORDAN 2
JORDAN (SWAT)
BANGLADESH 2
INDIA 1
INDIA 2
PAKISTAN
CHILE
CHILE
CHILE
CHILE (+)
NEPAL
URUGUAY
URUGUAY
PERU
URUGUAY & PERU (+)
INDIA 3
RWANDA
BANGLADESH 3
SENEGAL
Port-de-Paix
St Louis de Nord
Anse-à-Foleur
Jean-Rabel
Môle St-Nicolas
Port-Margot
Cap-Haitien
Fort Liberte
Ouanaminthe
Gonaives
Saint-Marc
Verrettes
Petite Rivière de Nippes
Miragoâne
Jérémie
Les Cayes
Port-Salut
Arcahaie
Croix des Bouquets
Léogâne
Jacmel
Côtes-de-fer
Baie de Henne
Bombardopolis
Anse Rouge
Terre Neuve
Gros Morne
Plaisance
Pilate
Acul du Nord
Milot
Grande Rivière du Nord
Limonade
Terrier Rouge
Sainte Suzanne
Marmelade
Ennery
Bahon
Saint Raphael
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye
Pignon
Vallieres
Mont Organise
Dessalines
Grande Saline
Hinche
Thomassique
Thomonde
Cerca la Source
Lascahobas
Mirebalais
Baptiste
Saveneme
Belladere
Saut-d'Eau
Cabaret
La Chapelle
Magasin
Pointe-à-Raquette
Canal de la Gonâve
Canal de Saint Marc
Ile de la Gonâve
Abricots
Trou Bonbon
Dame Marie
Moron
Chambellan
Anse d'Hainault
Source Chaude
Les Irois
Tiburon
Roseaux
Corail
Pestel
Baradères
Petit Trou de Nippes
Anse-à-Veau
Camp Perrin
Maniche
Cavaillon
St Louis du Sud
Aquin
Vieux Bourg d'Aquin
L'Asile
Chantal
Torbeck
St Jean du Sud
Les Anglais
Chardonnieres
Port-à-Piment
Coteaux
Roche-à-Bateau
Les Anglais
Petite Anse
Thiotte
Grand Gosier
Banane
Anse-à-Pitres
Trois
Petit Goâve
Grand Goâve
Bainet
Cap Rouge
Fonds Verrettes
Gaillard
Fond Parisien
Jumani
Malpasse
Belladere
Lascahobas
Baptiste
Savenette
Thomazeau
Cornillon
Croix des Bouquets
Gaillard
Killick
Brache
Jacmel
Marigot
Ile de la Tortue
Canal de la Tortue
Pointe Jean-Rabel
Cap Saint Nicolas
Cap-à-Foux
Baie de Henne
Bassin Bleu
Port Margot
Limonade
Terrier Rouge
Fermer
Sainte Suzanne
Ouanaminthe
Perches
Vallieres
Mont Organise
Pignon
Ranquite
Thomonde
Cerca la Source
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Lac de Peigre
Belladere
Lascahobas
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Maniche
Camp Perrin

United Nations S/2016/226

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 March 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 4 March 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Mission in Colombia, established by the Security Council in resolution 2261 (2016) of 25 January 2016.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Mr. Jean Arnault (France) as my Special Representative for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-03758 (E) 090316

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United Nations S/2016/227

Security Council

Distr.: General
8 March 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 4 March 2016 (S/2016/226) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Jean Arnault (France) as your Special Representative for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Ismael Abraão **Gaspar Martins**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations A/70/780–S/2016/228

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 March 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda items 44 and 79 (a)

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Question of Cyprus

Oceans and the law of the sea

Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to my letter dated 31 January 2014, I wish to bring to your attention, and strongly protest, the completion of the illegal water connection, through a subsea water pipeline, between Turkey and the areas of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by the Republic of Turkey since 1974 contrary to international law.

This conduct constitutes yet another deliberate act of provocation by Turkey aiming at consolidating Turkish effective political and economic control over the occupied part of Cyprus and to bolster the military occupation of the northern part of the island. Moreover, it is yet another internationally wrongful act which occurs during a critical phase of the negotiating process for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Through this act, Turkey attempts to reinforce its hold on the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus, not only by maintaining ownership of the infrastructure and the water that will be transferred to Cyprus, but also by dictating the terms of its management. At the inauguration ceremony of the project on 17 October 2015, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, stated that Turkey and the so-called "TRNC" have been interlocked in such a way that they will never be separated, thus revealing Ankara's true intentions. So much for the euphemism "peace project"!

Turkey's assertion that this is a development project which will benefit all of Cyprus is legally unfounded, misleading and false. No authorization has even been sought from or granted by the competent authorities of the Government of Cyprus, as is required under international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the applicable national legislation.

Laying of pipelines in Cyprus's territorial waters, continental shelf and infrastructure works in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus, stands in blatant violation of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as of the human rights of the Greek Cypriot owners whose properties have been adversely affected by this project.

16-03805 (E) 110316

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Turkey also stands in violation of basic principles of international humanitarian law.[1] As the occupying power, Turkey is in breach of its obligations under articles 43 and 46 of the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 (which has entered the realm of customary international law) to respect the laws of the Republic of Cyprus and private property.

Water shortage has always been a major challenge for Cyprus, and a comprehensive water policy has always been a priority issue for successive Governments of the Republic. In the Government-controlled areas of the Republic, the water shortage problem has been dealt with through the implementation of an integrated water policy, including the construction of desalination plants and sewage systems.

Moreover, since 1974, the Government of Cyprus has undertaken significant maintenance and repair works for the dams providing water to the occupied areas. In addition, in 2010 the Government of the Republic of Cyprus supported the construction, in those areas, of a desalination plant under the European Union Financial Aid Regulation for the Turkish Cypriot Community, a project which unfortunately was hindered by the Turkish occupation forces.

Given the rejection of alternative ways to address water shortage, and in the light of several statements made by high-ranking Turkish State officials regarding the significance of this project for Turkey and its subordinate local administration in the occupied part of Cyprus, it can be safely assumed that Turkey's real aim is to cement the illegal division of the island and to strengthen the secessionist entity's economic and political subordination to Turkey.

At this stage, it is necessary to focus on efforts towards an early solution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of the island. Only in a reunified Cyprus will it be possible to formulate and implement a holistic strategy for development and to address a number of pressing issues, including adequate and sustainable water supply, away from foreign intervention, control or undue dependence.

My Government kindly requests your assistance in sending a strong message to Ankara, to the effect that the Republic of Turkey must comply with international law, respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, and refrain from creating new faits accomplis on the ground, which jeopardize the peace process and potentially deepen the division of the island. Such actions, especially when accompanied by provocative statements, not only complicate the negotiating process, but also undermine the much-needed trust between the two communities and the efforts to maintain a conducive climate at a very critical juncture.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 44 and 79 (a), and of the Security Council, and have it published on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the Secretariat in the next Law of the Sea Bulletin.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**

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[1] The applicability of the rules of international humanitarian law to the Cypriot situation has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights: see *Varnava and Others v. Turkey* (Grand Chamber), 18 September 2009, paragraph 185.

United Nations S/2016/229

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 March 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Today was yet another deadly day of terror for the citizens of Israel. We witnessed not one, but three bloody terror attacks, from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv-Jaffa to Petah Tikvah, in the span of less than 90 minutes.

In Jaffa, a Palestinian terrorist stabbed a 29-year-old American tourist to death and wounded at least 10 other people, 5 of them seriously. This was a true stabbing spree, as the terrorist ran up and down the boardwalk, attempting to stab as many people as he could. He left behind a trail of blood.

Less than an hour before the Jaffa attack, two Israeli police officers were wounded in a shooting attack near Herod's Gate of the Old City of Jerusalem. One of the officers, 49 years of age, is still in critical condition. This came after an attempted stabbing attack in the same location this morning.

At just the same time, in Petah Tikvah, a 20-minute drive from Tel Aviv, a Palestinian terrorist followed an Israeli man into a wine shop in the centre of the city and repeatedly stabbed him in his upper body.

The number of stabbings and shootings against Israeli citizens grows longer every day. Since September 2015, Israelis have faced over 300 attacks, more than 300 separate attacks in just 145 days. This comes to two terror attacks a day, every day, for six months. This ongoing wave of terror has claimed the lives of 34 victims — 34 fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, husbands and wives, buried by their loved ones. Yet the Security Council has not condemned Palestinian terror even once.

Not only does the Palestinian Authority refuse to condemn such horrendous acts of terror; they actively encourage them. These attacks are a direct result of the malicious incitement and violent rhetoric coming from the highest levels of leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

The impact of this incitement on Palestinian youth, the most vulnerable segment of society, has been devastating. In a disturbing new trend, over 30 per cent of these murderous attacks have been carried out by Palestinian minors, some of them as young as 11 years old.

Today's attack was no exception. The assailant in the Petah Tikvah attack had just turned 17.

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Palestinian incitement has not only been fatal for the innocent Israelis who have lost their lives; it is also a crime against Palestinian children and youth. The international community must stop ignoring this ongoing campaign of brainwashing and indoctrination.

I ask you to open your eyes, condemn the ongoing attacks and demand that the Palestinian leadership finally put an end to the incitement.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/230

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 March 2016
English
Original: French

Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from the Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition, Najib Ghadbian, dated 8 March 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexis **Lamek**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

On behalf of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and as requested by the General Coordinator of that Committee, Riad Hijab, it is my honour to transmit to you as an enclosure to this letter a letter from Mr. Hijab dated 7 March 2016, in which he discusses the violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition
to the United Nations

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

The High Negotiations Committee of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces strongly denounces the fact that killings have continued in Syria since the truce came into effect. We wish to draw attention to the recent escalation of hostilities by Assad regime forces, Iranian forces, the sectarian militia associated with them and the air force of the Russian Federation in all residential areas of Syria. Those actions are a direct violation of Security Council resolution 2268 (2016) and the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria.

Since the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities came into effect in Syria, more than 100 deaths have been recorded. Most of the victims were civilians. The Russian air force violated the Terms less than 24 hours after they came into effect, heavily bombarding opposition-held areas and deliberately targeting civilians and units of the Free Syrian Army that are party to the agreement. Among those killed by Russian Federation forces was a pregnant woman in Jisr al-Shughur, who died on 28 February after Russian Federation planes dropped cluster munitions on residential areas. Courageous rescue workers of the Syrian Civil Defence have been wounded in attacks by the Assad regime and its allied militia, and 20 children have been killed, according to data collected by the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria. The summary provides a full overview of documented violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities.

The Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities obligate the Assad regime forces, their Iranian allies, the militia associated with them and the air force of the Russian Federation to cease attacks with any weapons, including aerial bombardments, against the armed opposition groups. Yet since the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities came into effect, the Assad regime and Russian forces have carried out more than 100 air strikes across 50 areas controlled by armed opposition units party to the Terms. Indiscriminate weapons, including barrel bombs, cluster munitions, thermobaric weapons and other dumb bombs, have repeatedly been deployed in opposition-held areas where neither Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) nor the Nusrah Front are present, contrary to the allegations made by Russia in order to justify its savage bombardment and killing of civilians and Free Syrian Army units, which are parties to the agreement and have abided by it.

According to reports, dozens of Free Syrian Army members were killed in the first week after the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities came into effect. The air strikes and attacks of the Assad regime and the Russian Federation forces did not affect areas under the control of ISIL. They focused instead on opposition-held areas in Idlib, Homs, Aleppo, Dar'a, Ladhiqiyah and Rif Dimashq.

The Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities require that all parties refrain from acquiring or seeking to acquire territory from other parties to the ceasefire. The Assad regime has refused to comply, continuing its perfidious efforts to make territorial advances east of Damascus, in Ladhiqiyah and the in countrysides of Aleppo and Hama.

The Assad regime has continued to kill civilians and deny humanitarian aid to those in need. In direct violation of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities and a series of Security Council resolutions, including resolutions and 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2209 (2015), 2254 (2015) and 2258 (2015), the Assad regime continues to

use starvation and siege as weapons to kill civilians, something that amounts to a war crime. It denies millions of Syrians urgently needed access to food and medicine in a calculated effort to starve Syrian civilians into submission. As a result, more than one million people remain trapped in besieged areas in several Syrian regions, despite Member States' clear mandate to deliver aid irrespective of the Syrian regime's agreement.

The High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces therefore calls on Member States to:

(i) Condemn the repeated and systematic violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities by Assad regime forces, Iranian forces, the sectarian militia associated with them and the air force of the Russian Federation, including their deliberate efforts to target and kill opposition units party to the agreement, their indiscriminate attacks on civilians, their deliberate denial of humanitarian aid, and their efforts to acquire new territory;

(ii) Demand a mechanism for the objective, neutral, and transparent monitoring, verification and enforcement of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities in order to ensure that the Russian Federation does not exploit the situation to cover up its daily war crimes against Syrian people;

(iii) Stipulate clear consequences for violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities, including measures to protect civilians from indiscriminate air strikes;

(iv) Lift the sieges on all Syrian cities, towns, and villages where civilians, in particular women and children, are suffering from a severe shortage of food and medical supplies and are in mortal peril owing to the lengthy siege imposed on them by regime forces and their foreign sectarian militia allies; and, where necessary, air-drop aid to besieged communities.

The repeated, systematic and deliberate violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities committed by the Assad forces, Iranian forces, the sectarian militia associated with them and the air force of the Russian Federation risk undermining the truce and efforts to achieve a political solution in Syria. By continuing to violate the agreement, the regime and the Russian Federation clearly seek to make any progress in the political process impossible.

The Syrian opposition has steadfastly sought to implement the truce agreement in good faith. We continue to work to bring about a political solution to the Syrian crisis in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, which provides for the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. Such a solution would require Bashar al-Assad to leave as soon as that body is established and have no role in the future of Syria.

It is clear, however, that a political solution cannot be reached so long at the Assad regime and its Russian ally continue to kill civilians indiscriminately.

The Security Council has the capacity and the mandate to stop this systematic killing. We do not believe that anyone would want you to leave it too late.

(*Signed*) Riad **Hijab**
General Coordinator, High Negotiations Committee

Summary of violations of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities committed between 27 February and 7 March

In the first 10 days of the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities, over 190 documented violations took place. There are reports that Assad regime forces and Russian aircraft deployed cluster munitions, barrel bombs and thermobaric weapons. Those indiscriminate attacks resulted in at least 100 deaths. Most of the victims were civilians.

Only 24 hours after the agreement came into effect, the forces of Assad and Russia bombarded moderate opposition areas in Aleppo, Damascus, Dar'a, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, Ladhiqiyah and Rif Dimashq, killing at least 40 members of the Free Syrian Army. In that same time, a mere handful of ISIL terrorists were killed. Attacks on civilians and moderate opposition forces continued, as did the Assad regime's efforts to acquire territory: the Syrian regime attempted to make advances in Ladhiqiyah and the countryside north of Aleppo.

The following are some examples of recorded violations that have been documented by the Violations Documentation Centre, the Syrian Civil Defence, the Syrian Network for Human Rights and moderate armed groups on the ground:

- There were over 100 documented instances of air strikes, shelling, shootings and mortar fire attacks by Assad regime and Russian forces, resulting in at least 100 deaths.
- Most of the casualties of the Russian and Assad regime attacks were civilians, including eight women and 20 children.
- Banned weapons, including cluster munitions, barrel bombs and thermobaric weapons, continued to be used in civilian areas. There are unconfirmed reports of chemical weapons use in the eastern Ghutah.
- More than 90 homes were damaged or destroyed as a result of Syrian regime and Russian Federation attacks on civilian areas.
- Russian and Assad regime attacks focused on areas that are not held by ISIL, including Aleppo, Damascus, Dar'a, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, Ladhiqiyah and Rif Dimashq.
- Air strikes accounted for 50 per cent of all victims killed by the Assad regime and Russia.
- Air strikes were wildly indiscriminate, with civilians accounting for 98 per cent of the victims.
- People in besieged and hard-to-reach areas died from starvation and lack of medical care.
- More than 10 of those who were detained died under torture in the prisons of the Assad regime.